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CLASS FORCING, THE FORCING THEOREM AND BOOLEAN
COMPLETIONS
PETER HOLY, REGULA KRAPF, PHILIPP LU¨CKE, ANA NJEGOMIR, AND PHILIPP SCHLICHT
Abstract. The forcing theorem is the most fundamental result about set forcing, stating that
the forcing relation for any set forcing is definable and that the truth lemma holds, that is
everything that holds in a generic extension is forced by a condition in the relevant generic
filter. We show that both the definability (and, in fact, even the amenability) of the forcing
relation and the truth lemma can fail for class forcing.
In addition to these negative results, we show that the forcing theorem is equivalent to the
existence of a (certain kind of) Boolean completion, and we introduce a weak combinatorial
property (approachability by projections) that implies the forcing theorem to hold. Finally, we
show that unlike for set forcing, Boolean completions need not be unique for class forcing.
1. Introduction
The classical approach to generalize the technique of forcing with set-sized partial orders to
forcing with class partial orders is to work with countable transitive models M of some theory
extending ZF− and partial orders P definable over M (in the sense that both the domain of P
and the relation ≤P are definable over the model 〈M,∈〉). By ZF
− we mean the usual axioms
of ZF without the power set axiom, however including Collection instead of Replacement.1 In
this situation, we say that a filter G on P is P-generic over M if G meets every dense subset
of P that is definable over M . We let MP denote the collection of all P-names contained in
M . Since M |= ZF−, MP is definable over M . Given a P-generic filter G over M , we define
M [G] = {σG | σ ∈MP} to be the corresponding class generic extension. Finally, given a formula
ϕ(v0, . . . , vn−1) in the language L∈ of set theory, a condition p in P and σ0, . . . , σn−1 ∈ MP, we
let p MP ϕ(σ0, . . . , σn−1) denote the statement that ϕ(σ
G
0 , . . . , σ
G
n−1) holds in M [G] whenever G
is a P-generic filter over M with p ∈ G.
The forcing theorem is the most fundamental result in the theory of forcing with set-sized
partial orders. The work presented in this paper is motivated by the question whether fragments
of this result also hold for class forcing. Given a countable transitive model M of some theory
extending ZF−, a partial order P definable over M and an L∈-formula ϕ(v0, . . . , vn−1), we will
consider the following fragments of the forcing theorem for notions of class forcing.
(1) We say that P satisfies the definability lemma for ϕ over M if the set
{〈p, σ0, . . . , σn−1〉 ∈ P×M
P × . . .×MP | p MP ϕ(σ0, . . . , σn−1)}
is definable over M .
(2) We say that P satisfies the truth lemma for ϕ over M if for all σ0, . . . , σn−1 ∈ MP and
every P-generic filter G over M with the property that ϕ(σG0 , . . . , σ
G
n−1) holds in M [G],
there is a condition p ∈ G with p MP ϕ(σ0, . . . , σn−1).
(3) We say that P satisfies the forcing theorem for ϕ over M if P satisfies both the definability
and the truth lemma for ϕ over M .
Another basic result that is fundamental for the development of forcing with set-sized partial
orders is the existence of a Boolean completion for separative partial orders,2 its uniqueness up to
2010 Mathematics Subject Classification. 03E40, 03E70, 03E99.
Key words and phrases. Class forcing, Forcing theorem, Boolean completions.
The first, third and fifth author were partially supported by DFG-grant LU2020/1-1. The authors would like
to thank Joel David Hamkins for the careful reading of the paper and numerous useful comments.
1Note that in the absence of the power set axiom, Collection does not follow from Replacement and many
important set-theoretical results can consistently fail in the weaker theory. For further details, consult [GHJ11].
2A partial order (or, more generally, a preorder) P is separative if for all p, q ∈ P , if p 6≤ q then there exists
r ≤ p such that r ⊥ q.
1
2 PETER HOLY, REGULA KRAPF, PHILIPP LU¨CKE, ANA NJEGOMIR, AND PHILIPP SCHLICHT
isomorphism and the equality of the corresponding forcing extensions. This motivates our interest
in the following notions.
(4) Let B be a Boolean algebra that is definable over M (in the sense that both the domain
of B and all Boolean operations are definable over the model 〈M,∈〉). We say that B is
M -complete if supBA exists in B for every A ⊆ B with A ∈M .
(5) We say that P has a Boolean completion in M if there is an M -complete Boolean algebra
B and an injective dense embedding π from P into B \ {0B} such that both B and π are
definable over M .
(6) We say that P has a unique Boolean completion in M if P has a Boolean completion B0
in M and for every other Boolean completion B1 of P in M , there is an isomorphism in V
between B0 and B1 which fixes P.
In standard accounts on class forcing (see [Fri00]) one studies generic extensions with additional
predicates for the generic filter and the ground model and focuses on pretame (resp. tame) notions
of forcing, i.e. notions of forcing which preserve ZF− (resp. ZF) with respect to these predicates. In
particular, Sy Friedman shows in [Fri00] that if the ground model satisfies ZF, then every pretame
forcing satisfies the forcing theorem. The converse is false: A simple notion of class forcing which
does not preserve Replacement is Col(ω,Ord), the class of all finite partial functions from ω to
Ord, ordered by reverse inclusion. However, this notion of forcing still satisfies the forcing theorem
(see [Fri00, Proposition 2.25] or Section 6 of this paper). In this paper, we will mostly investigate
properties of non-pretame notions of class forcing.
In the remainder of this introduction, we present the results of this paper. We will later prove
these statements in a more general setting than the one outlined above. This will allow us to also
prove results for models containing more second-order objects, like models of Kelley-Morse class
theory KM (see [Ant15]). We will outline this setting in Section 3.
Throughout this paper, we will work in a model V of ZFC and, given a set M and a recursively
enumerable theory T extending ZF−, we say that “M is a model of T” to abbreviate the statement
that M satisfies every axiom of T in V with respect to some formalized satisfaction relation (as
in [Dra74, Chapter 3.5]). Note that, in general, the assumption that such a model V containing
a transitive countable set M of T exists is stronger than the assumption that T is consistent. If
T ⊇ ZF, then the results of this paper can also be proven in the setting of [Kun80, Ch. VII, §9,
Approach (1b)], where one works with a language that extends the language of set theory by a
constant symbol M˙ , and a model of a theory in this language that extends T by the scheme of
axioms stating that every axiom of T holds relativized to M˙ . The consistency of this theory is
equivalent to the consistency of T. For this paper, we have nonetheless chosen the first approach,
because it makes many arguments more intuitive and easier to state.
1.1. Positive results. The results of this paper will show that the forcing theorem (in fact both
the definability of the forcing relation and the truth lemma), the amenability of the forcing relation
and the existence of a (unique) Boolean completion can fail for class forcing. The following two
positive results show that non-trivial implications hold between some of these properties. The
first result shows that a failure of the forcing theorem already implies a failure of the definability
lemma for atomic formulae. This result is proven by carefully mimicking the induction steps in
the proof of the forcing theorem for set forcing.
Theorem 1.1. Let M be a countable transitive model of ZF− and let P be a partial order that is
definable over M . If P satisfies the definability lemma for either “v0 ∈ v1” or “v0 = v1” over M ,
then P satisfies the forcing theorem for all L∈-formulae over M .
In Section 6, we will present a criterion that will allow us to show that many notions of class
forcing satisfy the definability lemma for atomic formulae and thus, by the above result, the full
forcing theorem (that is, the forcing theorem for all L∈-formulae).
The next result shows that the existence of a Boolean completion is equivalent to the validity
of the forcing theorem for all L∈-formulae. We will prove this result by showing that the forcing
relation for the quantifier-free infinitary language LOrd,0 of set theory, allowing set-sized conjunc-
tions and disjunctions and also allowing reference to a predicate for the generic filter, is definable
under either assumption listed in the theorem.
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Theorem 1.2. Let M be a countable transitive model of ZF− and let P be a separative partial
order that is definable over M . If either the power set axiom holds in M or there is a well-ordering
of M that is definable over M , then the following statements are equivalent.
(1) P satisfies the forcing theorem for all L∈-formulae over M .
(2) P has a Boolean completion in M .
1.2. Negative results. In the following, we present results showing that each of the properties
considered above can fail for class forcing. The first result shows that there is always a notion of
class forcing that does not satisfy the definability lemma. The proof of this result uses a notion of
class forcing that was introduced by Sy Friedman and that is mentioned in [Sta03, Remark 1.8].
We will present and study this notion of forcing in detail in Section 2.
Theorem 1.3. Let M be a countable transitive model of ZF−. Then there is a partial order P
that is definable over M and does not satisfy the forcing theorem for atomic formulae over M .
Our next result shows that even stronger failures of the definability lemma are possible for the
above forcing. Its proof relies on so-called Paris models, i.e. ∈-structures M with the property
that each ordinal ofM is definable inM by a formula without parameters. Such models have been
considered by Ali Enayat in [Ena05]. The stronger concept of pointwise definable models (that
is, ∈-structures over which each of their elements is definable by a formula without parameters)
was studied in depth in [HLR13]. Note that the existence of a countable transitive model of
ZFC yields the existence of a countable transitive Paris model satisfying the axioms of ZFC – this
follows from [HLR13, Theorem 11], where it is shown that every countable transitive model of ZFC
has a pointwise definable class forcing extension. However, in Section 8 we will, for the benefit of
the reader, sketch a simplified argument to verify (the weaker statement) that certain countable
transitive models of ZFC have class forcing extensions which are Paris models.
Theorem 1.4. Let M be a countable transitive Paris model with M |= ZF−. Then there is a
partial order P such that P is definable over M and the P-forcing relation for “v0 = v1” is not
M -amenable, i.e. there is a set x ∈M such that
{〈p, σ, τ〉 ∈ P×MP ×MP | p MP σ = τ} ∩ x
is not an element of M .
Next, we consider failures of the truth lemma. The witnessing forcing notion for the next
theorem will be the two-step iteration of the above notion of class forcing that has a generic
extension which is a Paris model and the aforementioned notion of class forcing of Sy Friedman.
Theorem 1.5. Assume that M is a countable transitive model of ZF− such that either M is
uncountable in L[M ] and ωM ∩ L[M ] ⊆ M , or M satisfies V = L and there is a countable subset
C of P(M) such that 〈M, C〉 is a model of KM. Then there is a partial order P that is definable
over M and that does not satisfy the truth lemma for “v0 = v1” over M .
Finally, we show that the existence and uniqueness of a Boolean completion, in a countable
transitive M |= ZF− of which there exists a well-order of order-type OrdM that is definable over
M , of a notion of forcing P that is definable over M , are equivalent to P having the Ord-chain
condition (or simply Ord-cc) overM , that is the property that every antichain of P that is definable
over M is already an element of M . This will easily yield the following result.
Theorem 1.6. Let M be a countable transitive model of ZF− and suppose that there exists a
global well-order of order type OrdM that is definable over M . Then there is a notion of class
forcing which has two non-isomorphic Boolean completions in M .
2. Some notions of class forcing
In this section, we introduce several notions of class forcing that will later be used to verify the
negative results listed in Section 1.
Notation. Since we will frequently use names for ordered pairs, we introduce the notation
op(σ, τ) = {〈{〈σ,1P〉},1P〉, 〈{〈σ,1P〉, 〈τ,1P〉},1P〉}
for σ, τ ∈MP and α ∈ Ord. Clearly, op(σ, τ) is the canonical name for the ordered pair 〈σG, τG〉.
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Definition 2.1. Let M be a countable transitive model of ZF−.
(1) Let Col(ω,Ord)M denote the partial order Col(ω,OrdM ), i.e. Col(ω,Ord)M is the partial
order whose conditions are finite partial functions p : ω
par
−−→ OrdM ordered by reverse
inclusion.
(2) Define Col∗(ω,Ord)
M to be the (dense) suborder of Col(ω,Ord)M consisting of all condi-
tions p with dom(p) ∈ ω.
(3) Let Col≥(ω,Ord)
M be the notion of forcing whose conditions are finite partial functions
p : ω
par
−−→ OrdM ∪ {≥ α | α ∈ OrdM}, where ≥ α is an element ofM which is not in OrdM
for every α ∈ OrdM , and whose ordering is given by p ≤ q if and only if dom(p) ⊇ dom(q)
and for every n ∈ dom(q), either
• p(n) = q(n) or
• q(n) is ≥ α for some α ∈ OrdM and there is β ≥ α such that p(n) ∈ {β,≥ β}.
Note that all of these partial orders are definable over the corresponding model M .
Notation. Let P be a partial order, let σ be a P-name and let p be a condition in P. Then we
define the p-evaluation of σ to be
σp = {τp | ∃q ∈ P [〈τ, q〉 ∈ σ ∧ p ≤P q]}.
The next lemma gives some basic properties of the different collapse forcings defined above.
Lemma 2.2. Let M be a countable transitive model of ZF−.
(1) If G is a Col(ω,Ord)M -generic filter over M , then for every ordinal in M there is a
surjection from a subset of ω onto that ordinal in M [G].
(2) If G is a Col∗(ω,Ord)
M -generic filter over M , then M =M [G].
(3) No non-trivial maximal antichain of Col(ω,Ord)M or Col∗(ω,Ord)
M is an element of M .
(4) If M is a model of ZFC, then no non-trivial complete suborder of Col(ω,Ord)M or of
Col∗(ω,Ord)
M is an element of M .
(5) Col≥(ω,Ord)
M is the union of OrdM -many set-sized complete subforcings.
Proof. (1 ) Pick λ ∈ OrdM . Given α ∈ OrdM , define
Dα = {p ∈ Col(ω,Ord)
M | ∃n ∈ dom(p) [p(n) = α]}.
Then eachDα is dense in Col(ω,Ord)
M and definable overM . This implies that ifG is Col(ω,Ord)-
generic over M , then for every α ∈ M ∩ Ord there is an n < ω with {〈n, α〉} ∈ G. This shows
that
σ = {〈op(nˇ, αˇ), {〈n, α〉}〉 | α < λ, n < ω}
is a name for a surjection from a subset of ω onto λ.
(2) Let σ be a Col∗(ω,Ord)
M -name in M . Then ran(p) ⊆ rank(σ) holds for every condition p
in tc(σ) ∩ Col∗(ω,Ord)
M . If we define
D = {p ∈ Col∗(ω,Ord)
M | rank(σ) ∈ ran(p)},
then D is dense in Col∗(ω,Ord)
M and definable over M . Moreover, by the above observation, we
have σG = σp ∈M , whenever G is an M -generic filter on Col∗(ω,Ord)M and p ∈ D ∩G, because
such p either extends or is incompatible to any condition in tc(σ).
(3) Let Col denote either Col(ω,Ord)M or Col∗(ω,Ord)
M . Assume that A ∈M is an antichain
of Col which is not equal to {1}. Pick a ∈ A. Now for any b ∈ A \ {a}, the domains of a and
b cannot be disjoint by incompatibility. Define c ∈ Col with dom(c) = dom(a) and for every
n ∈ dom(c), let c(n) = sup{b(n) | b ∈ A} + 1. Hence c is incompatible with every element of A,
showing that A is not maximal.
(4) This statement follows from the above results because our assumptions imply that set-sized
partial orders in M contain non-trivial maximal antichains.
(5) Let for every α ∈ OrdM , Col≥(ω, α) denote the subforcing of Col≥(ω,Ord
M ) consisting of
finite partial functions p : ω
par
−−→ α ∪ {≥ β | β ≤ α} with the induced ordering. Clearly,
Col≥(ω,Ord)
M =
⋃
α∈OrdM
Col≥(ω, α).
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It remains to check that for every α ∈ OrdM , Col≥(ω, α) is a complete subforcing of Col≥(ω,Ord)M .
Let A be a maximal antichain of Col≥(ω, α) and let p ∈ Col≥(ω,Ord)M . Consider the condition
p¯ ∈ Col≥(ω, α) which is obtained from p by replacing p(n) by ≥ α whenever p(n) ≥ α or p(n)
is of the form ≥ β for some β > α. Since A is a maximal antichain, there is a ∈ A such that a
and p¯ are compatible. Let q¯ ∈ Col≥(ω, α) be a common strengthening of p¯ and a. But then the
condition q obtained from q¯ by replacing q¯(n) by p(n) for every n ∈ dom(p) such that q¯(n) is of
the form ≥ α witnesses that p and a are compatible. 
The above computations show that, contrasting the situation with set-sized partial orders,
forcing with a dense suborder of a notion of class forcing P can produce different generic extensions
than forcing with P does.3 In a subsequent paper ([HKSa]), we will in fact show that for any notion
of class forcing P, the property that all forcing notions which contain P as a dense subforcing
produce the same generic extensions as P, is essentially equivalent to the pretameness of P.
Corollary 2.3. If M is a countable transitive model of ZF−, then there are partial orders P and
Q definable over M such that Q is a dense suborder of P and M = M [G ∩ Q] ( M [G] whenever
G is a P-generic filter over M . 
In Section 6 we will show that all of the partial orders that we have mentioned so far satisfy
the forcing theorem.
The following notion of class forcing due to Sy Friedman is mentioned in [Sta03, Remark 1.8].
It will be crucial for the proofs of the negative results listed in Section 1.
Definition 2.4. Let M be a countable transitive model of ZF−. Define FM to be the partial
order whose conditions are triples p = 〈dp, ep, fp〉 satisfying
(1) dp is a finite subset of ω,
(2) ep is a binary acyclic relation on dp,
(3) fp is an injective function with dom(fp) ∈ {∅, dp} and ran(fp) ⊆M ,
(4) if dom(fp) = dp and i, j ∈ dp, then we have i ep j if and only if fp(i) ∈ fp(j),
and whose ordering is given by
p ≤FM q ⇐⇒ dq ⊆ dp ∧ ep ∩ (dq × dq) = eq ∧ fq ⊆ fp.
Note that FM is definable over M .
Lemma 2.5. The set of all conditions p in FM with dom(fp) = dp is dense.
Proof. Pick p ∈ FM with dom(fp) = ∅ 6= dp. We inductively define (using that ep is acyclic) a
function f as follows. For every j ∈ dp let
f(j) = {f(i) | i ep j} ∪ {{∅, j}}.
Using that ∅ 6∈ range(f), it is easy to inductively verify that p¯ = 〈dp, ep, f〉 satisfies conditions (3)
and (4) above, and hence is an extension of p in FM with dom(fp¯) = dp¯. 
Lemma 2.6. If M is a countable transitive model of ZF− and G is an FM -generic filter over M ,
then there is a binary relation E on ω such that E ∈M [G] and the models 〈ω,E〉 and 〈M,∈〉 are
isomorphic in V.
Proof. Define an FM -name E˙ ∈M by setting
E˙ = {〈op(ˇi, jˇ), pi,j〉 | i, j ∈ ω, i 6= j},
where pi,j denotes the condition in FM with dpi,j = {i, j}, epi,j = {〈i, j〉} and fpi,j = ∅. Let
G be an FM -generic filter over M and put E = E˙G ∈ M [G]. Note that E =
⋃
{ep | p ∈ G}.
Define F =
⋃
{fp | p ∈ G}. By Lemma 2.5, the sets Dn = {p ∈ FM | n ∈ dom(fp)} are dense
in FM . Since these sets are definable over M , we can conclude that F is injective and that
dom(F ) = ω. In order to see that F is surjective, we claim that for every x ∈ M , the set
{p ∈ FM | x ∈ ran(fp)} is dense. In order to show this, let p = 〈dp, ep, fp〉 ∈ FM such that
x /∈ ran(fp). Using Lemma 2.5, we may assume that dom(fp) = dp. Choose j ∈ ω \ dp and define
dq = dp ∪ {j}, eq = ep ∪ {〈i, j〉 | fp(i) ∈ x} ∪ {〈j, i〉 | x ∈ fp(i)} and fq = fp ∪ {〈j, x〉}. Then
q = 〈dq, eq, fq〉 is an extension of p with x ∈ ran(fq).
3Note that it is still true that generic filters for P induce generic filters for its dense suborders and vice versa.
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It remains to check that F is an isomorphism between the models 〈ω,E〉 and 〈M,∈〉. Take
i, j < ω such that i E j, i.e. pi,j ∈ G. By the above computations, there is a condition p ∈ G with
i, j ∈ dom(fp). We then have i ep j and by (4) in Definition 2.4 we have F (i) = fp(i) ∈ fp(j) =
F (j). For the converse, suppose that x, y ∈M such that x ∈ y. By the above computations, there
is a condition p ∈ G and i, j ∈ dp with F (i) = fp(i) = x ∈ y = fp(j) = F (j). By (4) in Definition
2.4, this implies i ep j and therefore i E j holds. 
3. The general setting
In the following, we outline the general setting of this paper. That is, we will actually make use
of an approach that is slightly more general than the one presented in Section 1, namely one that
works with models that might contain more second-order objects than just the definable ones, and
moreover we will work with preorders instead of partial orders.
Notation. (1) We denote by GB− the theory in the two-sorted language with variables for
sets and classes, with the set axioms given by ZF− with class parameters allowed in the
schemata of Separation and Collection, and the class axioms of extensionality, foundation
and first-order class comprehension (i.e. involving only set quantifiers). Furthermore, we
denote the theory GB− enhanced with the power set axiom by GB (this is the common
collection of axioms of Go¨del-Bernays set theory).
(2) We let KM denote the axiom system of Kelley-Morse class theory. That is, in addition to
the usual ZFC axioms for sets with class parameters allowed in the schemata of Separation
and Collection, one also has the class axioms of Foundation, Extensionality, Replacement,
(second order) Comprehension and Global Choice. In particular, class recursion holds in
models of KM. For a detailed axiomatization of KM, see [Ant15].
(3) By a countable transitive model of GB− (or GB, KM), we mean a model M = 〈M, C〉 of
GB− (resp. GB, KM) such that M is transitive and both M and C are countable in V.
Example 3.1. (1) Let M be a countable transitive model of ZF− and let Def(M) be the set
of all subsets of M that are definable over 〈M,∈〉. Then 〈M,Def(M)〉 is a model of GB−.
(2) Let M be a countable transitive model of ZF satisfying V = L[A] and Replacement for
formulae mentioning the predicate A, and let C be Def(M,A). Then 〈M, C〉 is a model of
GB−. This is the approach used in [Fri00].
(3) Every countable transitive model of KM is a model of GB.
Fix a countable transitive model M = 〈M, C〉 of GB−. By a notion of class forcing (for M) we
mean a preorder P = 〈P,≤P〉 such that P,≤P ∈ C. We will frequently identify P with its domain
P . In the following, we also fix a notion of class forcing P = 〈P,≤P〉 for M.
We call σ a P-name if all elements of σ are of the form 〈τ, p〉, where τ is a P-name and p ∈ P.
Define MP to be the set of all P-names that are elements of M and define CP to be the set of all
P-names that are elements of C. In the following, we will usually call the elements of MP P-names
and we will call the elements of CP class P-names. If σ ∈MP is a P-name, we define
rankσ = sup{rank τ + 1 | ∃p ∈ P [〈τ, p〉 ∈ σ]}
to be its name rank.
We say that a filter G on P is P-generic over M if G meets every dense subset of P that is an
element of C. Given such a filter G and a P-name σ, we define the G-evaluation of σ as
σG = {τG | ∃p ∈ G [〈τ, p〉 ∈ σ]},
and similarly we define ΓG for Γ ∈ CP. Moreover, if G is P-generic over M, then we set M [G] =
{σG | σ ∈MP} and C[G] = {ΓG | Γ ∈ CP}, and call M[G] = 〈M [G], C[G]〉 a P-generic extension of
M.4
For all n < ω, we let Ln denote the first-order language that extends the language of set
theory L∈ by unary predicate symbols A0, . . . , An−1. Given an Ln-formula ϕ(v0, . . . , vm−1), a
tuple ~Γ = 〈Γ0, . . . ,Γn−1〉 ∈ (CP)n, a condition p ∈ P and names σ0, . . . , σm−1 ∈MP, we write
p M,
~Γ
P ϕ(σ0, . . . , σm−1)
4While it does not really play any role for the present paper which second order objects we allow for in our
generic extensions, we will argue in a subsequent paper ([HKSb]) that the above choice (namely C[G]) is canonical.
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to denote that ϕ(σG0 , . . . , σ
G
m−1) holds in the structureM~Γ[G] = 〈M [G],∈,Γ
G
0 , . . . ,Γ
G
n−1〉 whenever
G is a P-generic filter over M with p ∈ G. Whenever the context is clear, we will omit the
superscripts and subscripts.
Our choice of considering preorders instead of partial orders is due to the reason that in the
case of a two-step iteration P ∗ Q˙ of notions of class forcing, as defined in [Fri00] (see also Section
8 of the present paper), we will have conditions of the form 〈p, q˙〉 for p ∈ P and p forcing that
q˙ ∈ Q˙. In general there will be distinct pairs 〈p, q˙0〉 and 〈p, q˙1〉 such that p P q˙0 = q˙1, i.e. one
naturally obtains a preorder that is not antisymmetric. However, in some contexts it will become
crucial for our orderings to be antisymmetric. In that case we will use the following additional
property:
Definition 3.2. We say that a model 〈M, C〉 of GB− satisfies representatives choice, if for every
equivalence relation E ∈ C there is A ∈ C and a surjective map π : dom(E) → A in C such that
〈x, y〉 ∈ E if and only if π(x) = π(y).
Using representatives choice, given a preorder P = 〈P,≤P〉 ∈ C, by considering the equivalence
relation
p ≈ q iff p ≤P q ∧ q ≤P p,
we obtain a partial order Q ∈ C and a surjective map π : P → Q in C such that for all p, q ∈ P,
p ≈ q if and only if π(p) = π(q).
Clearly, representatives choice follows from the existence of a global well-order. Furthermore,
if M satisfies the power set axiom, then we also obtain representatives choice, since we can use
Scott’s trick to obtain the sets [p] = {q ∈ P | q ≈ p ∧ ∀r [q ≈ r → rank(q) ≤ rank(r)]} ∈ M for
p ∈ P.
4. The forcing theorem
In this section, we fix a countable transitive model M = 〈M, C〉 of GB− and a notion of class
forcing P = 〈P,≤P〉 for M. We will show that in order to obtain the forcing theorem for all
Ln-formulae, it suffices that the forcing relation for either the formula “v0 ∈ v1” or the formula
“v0 = v1” is definable, thus proving Theorem 1.1.
Definition 4.1. Let ϕ ≡ ϕ(v0, . . . , vm−1) be an Ln-formula.
(1) We say that P satisfies the definability lemma for ϕ over M if
{〈p, σ0, . . . , σm−1〉 ∈ P ×M
P × . . .×MP | p M,
~Γ
P ϕ(σ0, . . . , σm−1)} ∈ C
for all ~Γ ∈ (CP)n.
(2) We say that P satisfies the truth lemma for ϕ over M if for all σ0, . . . , σm−1 ∈ MP,
~Γ ∈ (CP)n and every filter G which is P-generic over M with
M~Γ[G] |= ϕ(σ
G
0 , . . . , σ
G
m−1),
there is p ∈ G with p M,
~Γ
P ϕ(σ0, . . . , σm−1).
(3) We say that P satisfies the forcing theorem for ϕ over M if P satisfies both the definability
lemma and the truth lemma for ϕ over M.
Our goal is to prove a generalization of Theorem 1.1 in our general setting which allows for
second-order objects. The first step to achieve this is to show that the definability lemma for some
atomic formula already implies the truth lemma to hold for all atomic formulae.
Lemma 4.2. Assume that P satisfies the definability lemma for “v0 ∈ v1” or “v0 = v1” over M.
Then P satisfies the forcing theorem for all atomic formulae.
Proof. Suppose first that the definability lemma holds for “v0 ∈ v1”. We denote by p 
M,∗
P σ ⊆ τ
the statement that for all 〈ρ, r〉 ∈ σ and for all q ≤P p, r, the set
Dρ,τ = {s ∈ P | s 
M
P ρ ∈ τ}
is dense below q in P. Furthermore, let p M,∗P σ = τ denote that p 
M,∗
P σ ⊆ τ and p 
M,∗
P τ ⊆ σ.
We show by induction on the lexicographic order on pairs 〈rank(σ) + rank(τ), rank(σ)〉 that the
following hold for each p ∈ P:
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(1) p MP σ ∈ τ if and only if the set
Eσ,τ = {q ∈ P | ∃〈ρ, r〉 ∈ τ [q ≤P r ∧ q 
M,∗
P σ = ρ]} ∈ C
is dense below p in P.
(2) p MP σ ⊆ τ if and only if p 
M,∗
P σ ⊆ τ . In particular, p 
M
P σ = τ if and only if p 
M,∗
P σ = τ .
(3) There is a dense subset of P in C that consists of conditions p in P such that either p MP σ ∈ τ
or p MP σ /∈ τ .
(4) There is a dense subset of P in C that consists of conditions p in P such that either p MP σ ⊆ τ
or p MP σ * τ .
To start the induction, note that if rank(σ) + rank(τ) = 0, then (1)–(4) trivally hold. Note
that (3) implies that the truth lemma holds for “v0 ∈ v1”. Furthermore, (4) implies the truth
lemma for “v0 ⊆ v1” and hence also for equality. Suppose now that (1)–(4) are satisfied for all
pairs of names 〈σ¯, τ¯ 〉 in MP for which 〈rank(σ¯) + rank(τ¯ ), rank(σ¯)〉 is lexicographically less than
〈rank(σ)+rank(τ), rank(σ)〉, that is rank(σ¯)+rank(τ¯ ) ≤ rank(σ)+rank(τ) and in case of equality,
we have that rank(σ¯) < rank(σ).
In order to prove (1), pick a condition p ∈ P with p MP σ ∈ τ and q ≤P p. Let G be P-generic
over M with q ∈ G. Then σG ∈ τG by assumption and hence there is 〈ρ, r〉 ∈ τ with r ∈ G and
σG = ρG. By our inductive assumption, property (4) yields a condition s ∈ G with s MP σ = ρ
which by (2) is equivalent to s M,∗P σ = ρ. Since G is a filter, there is t ∈ G with t ≤P q, r, s.
In particular, t ∈ Eσ,τ . For the other direction, suppose that Eσ,τ is dense below p. Let G be
P-generic overM with p ∈ G. By density of Eσ,τ we can take q ∈ G and 〈ρ, r〉 ∈ τ such that q ≤P r
and q M,∗P σ = ρ. Then r ∈ G and so ρ
G ∈ τG. Thus by our inductive assumption, condition (2)
implies that σG = ρG ∈ τG.
For (2), suppose first that p MP σ ⊆ τ , let 〈ρ, r〉 ∈ σ and let q ≤P p, r. Take a P-generic filter
G with q ∈ G. Then ρG ∈ σG ⊆ τG. By our inductive assumption, we can find s ∈ G so that
s MP ρ ∈ τ . Given any q
∗ ≤P q, by strengthening s if necessary, we can find such s ≤P q∗, as
desired. Conversely, assume that p M,∗P σ ⊆ τ and let G be P-generic over M with p ∈ G. Let
〈ρ, r〉 ∈ σ with r ∈ G. We have to show that ρG ∈ τG. Let q ∈ G be a common strengthening of p
and r. Then by assumption, the set Dρ,τ is dense below q. By genericity, we can take s ∈ Dρ,τ ∩G.
Using our inductive assumption, this shows that ρG ∈ τG, as desired.
For (3), consider the set
D = {p ∈ P | ∀〈ρ, r〉 ∈ τ ∀q ≤P p, r [q 1
M
P σ = ρ]}.
Then our inductive assumptions imply that D ∈ C. Moreover, condition (1) states that D is
nonempty below every p ∈ P with p 1MP σ ∈ τ . Hence it suffices to show that p 
M
P σ /∈ τ for every
p ∈ D, since then D ∪ {p ∈ P | p MP σ ∈ τ} ∈ C is a dense set of conditions deciding σ ∈ τ . So
take p ∈ D and suppose that p 1MP σ /∈ τ . Then there is a P-generic filter G containing p such that
σG ∈ τG. Then there must be 〈ρ, r〉 ∈ τ with r ∈ G and σG = ρG. By our inductive assumption,
we can find q ∈ G with q MP σ = ρ. By possibly strengthening q using that G is a filter, we may
assume that q ≤P p, r. But this contradicts that p ∈ D.
In order to verify (4), we define
E = {p ∈ P | ∃〈ρ, r〉 ∈ σ [p ≤P r ∧ ∀q ≤P p (q 1
M
P ρ ∈ τ)]}.
As above, E is in C inductively, and it is nonempty below every condition which does not force
σ ⊆ τ . As in the proof of (3) it remains to check that p MP σ * τ for each p ∈ E. Assume,
towards a contradiction, that there is p ∈ E with p 1MP σ * τ . Then there is a P-generic filter
with p ∈ G and σG ⊆ τG. Let 〈ρ, r〉 witness that p ∈ E. Then r ∈ G and so ρG ∈ σG ⊆ τG. Using
(3) inductively, we obtain q ∈ G with q MP ρ ∈ τ . But then there is s ≤P p, q, contradicting that
p ∈ E.
If the definability lemma holds for “v0 = v1”, we can define the P-forcing relation for “v0 ∈ v1”
by stipulating (as above) that p MP σ ∈ τ if and only if the set
{q ∈ P | ∃〈ρ, r〉 ∈ τ [q ≤P r ∧ q 
M
P σ = ρ]}
is dense below p. 
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Theorem 4.3. If P satisfies the definability lemma either for “v0 ∈ v1” or for “v0 = v1” over M,
then P satisfies the forcing theorem for every Ln-formula over M.
Proof. By the previous lemma, we already know that P satisfies the forcing theorem for all atomic
formulae. Let us next consider formulas of the form “v0 ∈ V1”, involving a class variable V1.
Let σ ∈MP and Γ ∈ CP. We claim that p M,ΓP σ ∈ Γ if and only if the set
D = {q ∈ P | ∃〈τ, r〉 ∈ Γ [q ≤P r ∧ q 
M
P σ = τ ]}
is dense below p. Note that D ∈ C since the forcing relation for equality is definable. First assume
that p M,ΓP σ ∈ Γ and let q ≤P p. Let G be a P-generic filter with q ∈ G. Then σ
G ∈ ΓG, i.e.
there is 〈τ, r〉 ∈ Γ such that r ∈ G and σG = τG. By the truth lemma for “v0 = v1”, there is
s ∈ G such that s MP σ = τ . But then every t ≤P q, r, s is in D. Conversely, if D is dense in P
and G is P-generic over M with p ∈ G, then we find q ≤P p in D ∩G. By definition of D there is
〈τ, r〉 ∈ Γ such that q ≤P r and q P σ = τ . Thus using that q, r ∈ G we get σG = τG ∈ ΓG. The
truth lemma for “v0 ∈ V1” follows from the truth lemma for equality.
For composite Ln-formulae, we can define the forcing relation by the usual recursion:
p M,
~Γ
P (ϕ ∧ ψ)(σ0, . . . , σm−1) ⇐⇒ p 
M,~Γ
P ϕ(σ0, . . . , σm−1) and p 
M,~Γ
P ψ(σ0, . . . , σm−1)
p M,
~Γ
P ¬ϕ(σ0, . . . , σm−1) ⇐⇒ ∀q ≤P p [q 1
M,~Γ
P ϕ(σ0, . . . , σm−1)]
p M,
~Γ
P ∀xϕ(σ0, . . . , σm−1, x) ⇐⇒ ∀τ ∈M
P [p M,
~Γ
P ϕ(σ0, . . . , σm−1, τ)],
where σ0, . . . , σm−1 ∈ MP and ~Γ ∈ (CP)n. The truth lemma can be verified as for set forcing in
each case. 
5. Boolean completions
In set forcing, every partial order has a unique Boolean completion whose elements are the
regular open subsets of the partial order. In this section we will investigate the relationship
between the existence of a Boolean completion and the forcing theorem for notions of class forcing.
Let M = 〈M, C〉 be a fixed countable transitive model of GB− and let P = 〈P,≤P〉 be a notion of
class forcing.
Let LOrd,0 denote the infinitary quantifier-free language that allows for set-sized conjunctions
and disjunctions. By LOrd,0(P,M) we denote the language of infinitary quantifier-free formulae in
the forcing language of P overM , that allows reference to the generic predicate G. More precisely,
its constants are all elements ofMP, and it has an additional predicate G˙. We define LOrd,0(P,M)
and the class FmlOrd,0(P,M) of Go¨del codes of L

Ord,0(P,M)-formulae by simultaneous recursion:
(1) Atomic LOrd,0(P,M)-formulae are of the form σ = τ, σ ∈ τ or pˇ ∈ G˙ for σ, τ ∈ M
P and
p ∈ P, where G˙ = {〈pˇ, p〉 | p ∈ P} ∈ CP is the canonical class name for the generic filter.
Go¨del codes of atomic LOrd,0(P,M)-formulae are given by
ppˇ ∈ G˙q = 〈0, p〉
pσ = τq = 〈1, σ, τ〉
pσ ∈ τq = 〈2, σ, τ〉.
(2) If ϕ is an LOrd,0(P,M)-formula, then so is ¬ϕ, and its Go¨del code is given by
p¬ϕq = 〈3, pϕq〉.
(3) If I ∈M and for every i ∈ I, ϕi is an LOrd,0(P,M)-formula such that 〈pϕiq | i ∈ I〉 ∈M ,
then so are
∨
i∈I ϕi and
∧
i∈I ϕi and their Go¨del codes are given by
p
∨
i∈I
ϕiq = 〈4, I, {〈i, pϕiq〉 | i ∈ I}〉
p
∧
i∈I
ϕiq = 〈5, I, {〈i, pϕiq〉 | i ∈ I}〉.
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Now define FmlOrd,0(P,M) ∈ C to be the class of all Go¨del codes of infinitary formulae in the
forcing language of P over M . If G is a P-generic filter over M and ϕ is an LOrd,0(P,M)-formula,
then we write ϕG for the formula obtained from ϕ by replacing each P-name σ occurring in ϕ
by its evaluation σG, and by evaluating G˙ as G. Note that ϕG is a formula in the infinitary
language LOrd,0 with an additional predicate for the generic G. Given an LOrd,0(P,M)-formula ϕ
and p ∈ P, we write p MP ϕ to denote that 〈M [G],∈, G〉 |= ϕ
G whenever G is a P-generic filter
over M with p ∈ G.
Definition 5.1. We say P satisfies the uniform forcing theorem for LOrd,0(P,M)-formulae if
{〈p, pϕq〉 ∈ P × FmlOrd,0(P,M) | p 
M
P ϕ} ∈ C
and P satisfies the truth lemma for every LOrd,0(P,M)-formula ϕ over M, i.e. for every P-generic
filter G over M, if M [G] |= ϕG then there is p ∈ G such that p MP ϕ.
The following lemma will allow us to infer that the uniform forcing theorem for infinitary
formulae is equivalent to the forcing theorem for equality.
Lemma 5.2. There is an assignment
FmlOrd,0(P,M)→M
P ×MP; pϕq 7→ 〈νpϕq, µpϕq〉
such that {〈pϕq, νpϕq, µpϕq〉 | pϕq ∈ Fml

Ord,0(P,M)} ∈ C and
(1) 1P P (ϕ↔ νpϕq = µpϕq)
for every ϕ ∈ LOrd,0(P,M).
Proof. We will argue by induction that, given names νψ and µψ satisfying (1) for every proper
subformula ψ of ϕ, we can, uniformly in pϕq, define νpϕq and µpϕq such that (1) holds.
Observe that since ¬
∧
i∈I ϕi ≡
∨
i∈I ¬ϕi and ¬
∨
i∈I ϕi ≡
∧
i∈I ¬ϕi we can assume that all
formulae are in negation normal form, i.e. the negation operator is applied to atomic formulae
only. Next, due to the equivalences
σ 6= τ ≡ σ * τ ∨ τ * σ,
σ * τ ≡
∨
〈π,p〉∈σ
(π /∈ τ ∧ pˇ ∈ G˙),
σ /∈ τ ≡
∧
〈π,p〉∈τ
(σ 6= π ∨ pˇ /∈ G˙),
we can further suppose that the only negated formulae are of the form pˇ /∈ G˙.
For the atomic cases, let
ν
ppˇ∈G˙q = {〈0ˇ, p〉}, µppˇ∈G˙q = 1ˇ,
ν
ppˇ /∈G˙q = ∅, µppˇ /∈G˙q = {〈0ˇ, p〉},
νpσ=τq = σ, µpσ=τq = τ,
νpσ∈τq = τ, µpσ∈τq = τ ∪ {〈σ,1P〉}.
It is easy to check that (1) holds for all atomic formulae.
If ϕ is a conjunction of the form
∧
i∈I ϕi and νpϕiq, µpϕiq have already been defined for i ∈ I,
let
νpϕq = {〈op(νpϕiq, iˇ),1P〉 | i ∈ I} and
µpϕq = {〈op(µpϕiq, iˇ),1P〉 | i ∈ I}.
If G is P-generic over M and M [G] |= ϕG, then M [G] |= ϕGi for all i ∈ I. By assumption, this
means that νG
pϕiq
= µG
pϕiq
for every i ∈ I, thus also νG
pϕq = µ
G
pϕq. The converse is similar.
Next suppose that ϕ is of the form
∨
i∈I ϕi. Let ν¯pϕiq = op(νpϕiq, iˇ) and µ¯pϕiq = op(µpϕiq, iˇ)
for each i ∈ I. Let
πpϕq = {〈op(ν¯pϕiq, µ¯pϕiq),1P〉 | i ∈ I} ∪ {〈op(ν¯pϕiq, ν¯pϕiq),1P〉 | i ∈ I},
νipϕq = πpϕq \ {〈op(ν¯pϕiq, µ¯pϕiq),1P}.
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Now we define
νpϕq = {〈ν
i
pϕq,1P〉 | i ∈ I}
µpϕq = νpϕq ∪ {〈πpϕq,1P〉}.
If G is P-generic and M [G] |= ϕG there is some i ∈ I such that M [G] |= ϕGi . By induction, this
implies that M [G] |= νG
pϕiq
= µG
pϕiq
. Thus πG
pϕq = (ν
i
pϕq)
G and νG
pϕq = µ
G
pϕq. For the converse,
suppose that there is a generic G such that M [G] |= ¬ϕG, hence for every i ∈ I, M [G] |= ¬ϕGi .
But then in M [G], for every i ∈ I, we have νG
pϕiq
6= µG
pϕiq
. Therefore πG
pϕq is not of the form
(νi
pϕq)
G for any i ∈ I, which shows that πG
pϕq ∈ µ
G
pϕq \ ν
G
pϕq. 
Next, we will use the above lemma to provide a characterization of notions of class forcing
which satisfy the forcing theorem, using Boolean completions.
Definition 5.3. If B is a Boolean algebra, then we say that B is M -complete if the supremum
supBA of all elements in A exists in B for every A ∈M with A ⊆ B.
Definition 5.4. We say that P has a Boolean completion in M if there is anM -complete Boolean
algebra B = 〈B, 0B, 1B ¬,∧,∨〉 such that B, all Boolean operations of B and an injective dense
embedding from P into B \ {0B} are elements of C.
Theorem 5.5. Assume that M satisfies representatives choice and let P = 〈P,≤P〉 be a separative
and antisymmetric notion of class forcing for M. Then the following statements (over M) are
equivalent:
(1) P satisfies the definability lemma for one of the L∈-formulae “v0 ∈ v1” or “v0 = v1”.
(2) P satisfies the forcing theorem for all L∈-formulae.
(3) P satisfies the uniform forcing theorem for all LOrd,0(P,M)-formulae.
(4) P has a Boolean completion.
Moreover separativity and antisymmetricity of P are only necessary for the implication from (3)
to (4), in particular the equivalence of (1)–(3) and those being a consequence of (4) holds as well
without these assumptions. In fact, without these assumptions, (4) implies that P is separative
and antisymmetric.
Proof. That (1) implies (2) is exactly the statement of Theorem 4.3. We start by showing that
(2) implies (3). In fact, we only need to assume the forcing theorem for equality. By Lemma 5.2,
for every LOrd,0(P,M)-formula ϕ there are P-names µpϕq and νpϕq such that {〈pϕq, µpϕq, νpϕq〉 |
pϕq ∈ FmlOrd,0(P,M)} ∈ C and 1P P (ϕ ↔ µpϕq = νpϕq). Therefore, we can define the forcing
relation for LOrd,0(P,M)-formulae by stipulating
p P ϕ ⇐⇒ p P νpϕq = µpϕq.
This makes the truth lemma for ϕ an immediate consequence of the truth lemma for equality. As
the definability lemma holds for equality and {〈pϕq, µpϕq, νpϕq〉 | pϕq ∈ Fml

Ord,0(P,M)} ∈ C, we
have {〈p, pϕq〉 | p P ϕ} = {〈p, pϕq〉 | p P νpϕq = µpϕq} ∈ C, thus proving the uniform forcing
theorem for LOrd,0(P,M)-formulae.
Assume now that (3) holds. We will construct what could be seen as an analogue of the Linden-
baum algebra. Define a Boolean algebra B in the following way: Consider the class FmlOrd,0(P,M)
of all Go¨del codes of infinitary formulae in the forcing language of P endowed with the canonical
Boolean operations, i.e. suprema and infima are just set-sized disjunctions and conjunctions of
formulae and complements are just negations. In order to obtain a complete Boolean algebra
from FmlOrd,0(P,M), consider the equivalence relation
pϕq ≈ pψq if and only if 1P P ϕ↔ ψ.
SinceM satisfies representatives choice, there are B ∈ C and π ∈ C such that π : FmlOrd,0(P,M)→
B is surjective and such that π(pϕq) = π(pψq) if and only if pϕq ≈ pψq. Now we can obtain induced
Boolean operations on B in the obvious way and define 0B = π(p0 6= 0q) and 1B = π(p0 = 0q).
Clearly, B is an M -complete Boolean algebra. We identify p ∈ P with the formula π(ppˇ ∈ G˙q),
thus obtaining a dense embedding i : P → B in C. Note that the injectivity of i follows from the
antisymmetry and separativity of P.
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Finally, we prove that (4) implies (1). Assume that P has a Boolean completion B(P). Without
loss of generality, we consider P to be a subset of B(P). For σ, τ ∈ MP, we recursively define the
Boolean values
Jσ ∈ τK = supP{Jσ = πK ∧ p | 〈π, p〉 ∈ τ},
Jσ = τK = Jσ ⊆ τK ∧ Jτ ⊆ σK and
Jσ ⊆ τK = infP{¬Jπ ∈ σK ∨ Jπ ∈ τK | π ∈ dom(σ)}.
Clearly, the set {〈σ, τ, Jϕ(σ, τ)K〉 | σ, τ ∈ MP} is in C for every atomic L∈-formula ϕ(v0, v1). We
claim that for every atomic formula ϕ(v0, v1), σ, τ ∈MP and for every P-generic G,
(2) M [G] |= ϕ(σG, τG) iff ∃p ∈ G(p ≤B(P) Jϕ(σ, τ)K)
This can be shown inductively by considering the recursive construction of Jϕ(σ, τ)K. For example,
assume that M [G] |= σG ∈ τG, i.e. there is 〈π, p〉 ∈ τ such that p ∈ G and σG = πG. Thus
inductively, there is r ∈ G such that r ≤B(P) Jσ = πK. Let q ∈ G be such that q ≤P p, r, so
q ≤B(P) Jσ = πK ∧ p ≤B(P) Jσ ∈ τK. Conversely, assume there is p ∈ G such that p ≤B(P) Jσ ∈ τK.
By the definition of Jσ ∈ τK, there is a strengthening q ∈ G of p and 〈π, r〉 ∈ τ such that
q ≤B(P) Jσ = πK ∧ r. Then by induction, σ
G = πG. Since r ∈ G, we obtain σG ∈ τG. The other
cases are similar.
Finally, using (2) we prove that p P ϕ(σ, τ) iff p ≤B(P) Jϕ(σ, τ)K. Since ≤B(P)∈ C, this will finish
the proof of the theorem. Suppose that p P ϕ(σ, τ). If p B(P) Jϕ(σ, τ)K, then by separativity of
B(P) and density of P in B(P) there is q ≤P p such that q⊥B(P)Jϕ(σ, τ)K. Now let G be P-generic
with q ∈ G. Then p is also in G, so by assumption M [G] |= ϕ(σG, τG). By (2) there is r ∈ G
with r ≤B(P) Jϕ(σ, τ)K. But then r and q are compatible, and hence so are q and Jϕ(σ, τ)K, which
is impossible. The converse is an immediate consequence of (2). 
In particular, this proves Theorem 1.2.
Corollary 5.6. If M is a model of GB then every separative antisymmetric pretame notion of
class forcing for M has a Boolean completion in M.
Proof. In [Fri00, Theorem 2.18], it is shown that every pretame notion of class forcing satisfies
the definability lemma for atomic formulae. The corollary thus follows from Theorem 5.5. 
Lemma 5.7. If M is a model of KM, then every separative antisymmetric notion of class forcing
for M has a Boolean completion in M.
Proof. LetM = 〈M, C〉 be a model of KM and let P = 〈P,≤P〉 be a separative antisymmetric notion
of class forcing for M. Making use of a suitable bijection in C, we may assume that P ∩OrdM = ∅.
Pick a disjoint partition 〈Aα | α ∈ Ord
M 〉 of OrdM such that {〈α, β〉 | β ∈ Aα} ∈ C. Using class
recursion, we define ⊆-increasing sequences 〈Pα | α ∈ Ord
M 〉 and 〈Qα | α ∈ Ord
M 〉 of separative
notions of class forcing containing P such that {〈p0, p1, α〉 | p0 ≤Pα p1} ∈ C, {〈q0, q1, α〉 | q0 ≤Qα
q1} ∈ C and P is dense in each P∗α and Q
∗
α, where P
∗
α and Q
∗
α are the notions of class forcing
obtained from Pα or Qα respectively, by removing all conditions p which stengthen every other
condition (i.e. which are equivalent to 0Pα or 0Qα respectively).
Let P0 = P . If α is a limit ordinal, let Pα =
⋃
β<α Pβ and ≤Pα=
⋃
β<α ≤Pβ for every β < α.
Suppose that Pα has been defined. We construct Qα by adding suprema for all subsets of Pα in
M , and then construct Pα+1 by adding negations for all elements of Qα.
More precisely, let Qα = Pα ∪ {supA | A ∈ M,A ⊆ Pα}, where supA ∈ A2·α is different for
each A ∈M with A ⊆ Pα and {〈A, supA〉 | A ∈M,A ⊆ Pα} ∈ C. Thus Qα ∈ C and we define an
ordering ≤Qα on Qα with ≤Qα ∩ (Pα × Pα) =≤Pα and ≤Qα∈ C in the following way:
supA ≤Qα p ⇐⇒ ∀a ∈ A(a ≤Pα p),
p ≤Qα supA ⇐⇒ A is predense below p in Pα,
supA ≤Qα supB ⇐⇒ ∀a ∈ A(a ≤Qα supB)
(3)
for all p ∈ Pα, and A,B ∈M with A ⊆ Pα. Firstly, we check that P is dense in Q∗α. If A ⊆ Pα with
A ∈ M such that supA ∈ Q∗α then A ∩ P
∗
α 6= ∅. Now if a ∈ A is in P
∗
α then a strenghtens supA,
and since by assumption P is dense in P∗α, there is p ∈ P with p ≤Pα a. In particular, p ≤Qα supA.
In order to prove that Qα is separative, since sup{p} = p for p ∈ Pα, it suffices to check that
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whenever A,B ⊆ Pα are sets with supA Qα supB, then there is p ≤Qα supA incompatible with
supB. So suppose that supA Qα supB. Then there is a ∈ A with a Qα supB, i.e. there exists
a strengthening p ∈ P of a such that each q ≤P p is incompatible with every element of B. In
particular, p is incompatible with supB.
Now let Pα+1 = Qα ∪ {¬q | q ∈ Qα}, where ¬q ∈ A2·α+1 is different for each q ∈ Qα, such that
{〈q,¬q〉 | q ∈ Qα} ∈ C. Thus Pα+1 ∈ C and we define an ordering ≤Pα+1 on Pα+1 extending ≤Qα
such that ≤Pα+1∈ C as follows:
p ≤Pα+1 ¬q ⇐⇒ p⊥Qαq,
¬p ≤Pα+1 q ⇐⇒ ∀r ∈ Qα (r ‖Qα p ∨ r ‖Qα q),
¬p ≤Pα+1 ¬q ⇐⇒ q ≤Qα p
(4)
for all p, q ∈ Qα. Again, we need to verify that P is dense in P∗α+1. Let q ∈ Qα be a condition such
that ¬q is non-zero, i.e. there is p ∈ Pα+1 such that ¬q Pα+1 p. If p ∈ Qα, then this means that
there is r ∈ Qα which is incompatible with p and q in Qα. In particular, r ≤Pα+1 ¬q and since
P is dense in Qα, we can strengthen r to some condition in P. Otherwise, p is of the form ¬r for
some r ∈ Qα. Therefore, r Qα q and so by separativity of Qα there is s ∈ Qα with s ≤Qα r and
s⊥Qαq. But then s ≤Pα+1 ¬q and once again we apply the density of P in Qα to obtain the result.
Secondly, we need to check that separativity is preserved. First suppose that p, q ∈ Qα such
that p Pα+1 ¬q. Then p and q are compatible, hence there is r ∈ Qα with r ≤Qα p, q. In
particular, r and ¬q are incompatible in Pα+1. If ¬p Pα+1 q, then there is r ∈ P such that r⊥Qαp
and r⊥Qαq. But this means that r ≤Pα+1 ¬p,¬q and so r and q are incompatible in Pα+1. Finally,
suppose that ¬p Pα+1 ¬q. Then q Qα p, so by separativity of Qα there is a strengthening
r ∈ Qα of q with r⊥Qαp. This means that r ≤Pα+1 ¬p and clearly r is incompatible with ¬q.
Then
⋃
α∈OrdM Pα =
⋃
α∈OrdM Qα is in C. However, the order given by p ≤ q if and only if
there is α ∈ OrdM such that p, q ∈ Pα and p ≤Pα q is only a preorder. To obtain a partial order,
consider the equivalence relation
p ≈ q ⇐⇒ ∃α ∈ OrdM (p, q ∈ Pα ∧ p ≤Pα q ∧ q ≤Pα p).
For p ∈
⋃
α∈Ord Pα, we define
[p] = {q | q ≈ p ∧ ∀r [r ≈ p→ rank(r) ≥ rank(q)]} ∈M
and B(P) = {[p] | ∃α ∈ OrdM (p ∈ Pα)}. Now we can introduce the ordering, suprema, infima
and complements in B(P) in the canonical way and let 1B(P) = [1P] as well as 0B(P) = ¬1B(P).
More precisely, if A ⊆ B(P) is a set, then let α ∈ OrdM be least such that every member of A
has a representative in (Vα)
M and A¯ = {p ∈ (Vα)M | ∃β ∈ Ord
M (p ∈ Pβ ∧ [p] ∈ A)}. Then
we can define supA = [supQβ A¯], where β is the least ordinal with A¯ ⊆ Pβ . It follows directly
from (3) that supA is well-defined and that it is the supremum of A in B(P). Complements are
defined in the same way, i.e. for [p] ∈ B(P) with p ∈ Qα put ¬[p] = [¬p], where ¬p is defined
in Pα+1. Again, it is a straightforward consequence of (4) and the density of P in Q∗α that this
is well-defined and that this actually defines the complement of [p] in B(P). Furthermore, if
A ∈ M is a subset of B(P), then we let inf A = ¬(sup{¬a | a ∈ A}). Moreover, the embedding
π : P→ B(P)\ {0B(P)}, p 7→ [p] is dense by construction and it follows from P being separative and
antisymmetric that π is injective. 
Note that Robert Owen has erroneously used a similar proof in [Owe08] to show that in ZFC
every separative antisymmetric notion of class forcing has a Boolean completion. However in
Section 7 we will show that the definability lemma for atomic formulae can fail in ZF− (and also
in ZFC), and hence Boolean completions do not always exist.
Regarding separativity, if the GB−-model M satisfies representatives choice, one can build a
separative quotient for any notion of class forcing. Recall that the separative quotient is obtained
by considering the equivalence relation
p ≈ q if and only if ∀r ∈ P (r ‖P p↔ r ‖P q).
Unlike in set forcing the equivalence classes can in fact be proper classes. Using representatives
choice, there is a surjective map π : P→ S(P) with π, S(P) ∈ C such that π(p) = π(q) if and only
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if p ≈ q. Furthermore, we equip S(P) with the usual ordering given by
π(p) ≤S(P) π(q) if and only if ∀r ∈ P(r ‖P p→ r ‖P q).
It is straightforward to check that the ordering≤S(P) is well-defined. For σ ∈M
P, define recursively
σπ = {〈τπ , π(p)〉 | 〈τ, p〉 ∈ σ}.
It is easy to see that as in set forcing, P and S(P) generate the same generic extensions and
p P ϕ(σ0, . . . , σn−1) ⇐⇒ π(p) S(P) ϕ(σ
π
0 , . . . , σ
π
n−1).
The following provides an alternative proof of [Ant15, Lemma 11, Lemma 12].
Corollary 5.8. If M is a model of KM, every notion of class forcing satisfies the forcing theorem
for all Ln-formulae over M.
Proof. Since by KM there is a global well-ordering of M, every notion of class forcing P of M
has a separative quotient S(P) over M. Therefore, Lemma 5.7 implies that S(P) has a Boolean
completion. By Theorem 5.5, S(P) satisfies the forcing theorem for all L∈-formulae. Now by the
above observations, this implies that P satisfies the forcing theorem for all L∈-formulae. 
6. Approachability by projections
As usual, we fix a countable transitive model M = 〈M, C〉 of GB−. We define a fairly weak
combinatorial condition on notions of class forcing that implies the forcing theorem to hold. In
particular, this property is satisfied by the forcing notions Col(ω,Ord)M , Col∗(ω,Ord)
M and
Col≥(ω,Ord)
M from Section 2.
Definition 6.1. We say that a class forcing P = 〈P,≤P〉 for M is approachable by projections if
it can be written as a continuous, increasing union P =
⋃
α∈OrdM Pα for a sequence 〈Pα | α ∈
Ord〉 ∈ C of notions of set forcing Pα = 〈Pα,≤Pα〉, where ≤Pα is the ordering on Pα induced
by P, for which there exists a sequence of maps 〈πα+1 | α ∈ Ord
M 〉 so that πα+1 : P → Pα+1,
{〈α, p, πα+1(p)〉 | α ∈ Ord
M , p ∈ P} ∈ C and for every α ∈ OrdM , the following hold:
(1) πα+1(1P) = 1P,
(2) ∀p, q ∈ P (p ≤P q → πα+1(p) ≤P πα+1(q)),
(3) ∀p ∈ P ∀q ≤Pα+1 πα+1(p)∃r ≤P p (πα+1(r) ≤P q),
(4) ∀p ∈ Pα ∀q ∈ P (πα+1(q) ≤P p→ q ≤P p) and
(5) πα+1 is the identity on Pα.
Note that (in order to justify our terminology), each πα+1 is in particular (by (1)–(3)) a pro-
jection from P to Pα+1. It follows that each πα+1 is a dense embedding and thus π′′α+1G is a
Pα+1-generic filter whenever G is a P-generic filter.
Lemma 6.2. If P =
⋃
α∈OrdM Pα is approachable by projections with projections πα+1 : P→ Pα+1
and G is P-generic, then M [G] ⊆
⋃
α∈OrdM M [π
′′
α+1G], and the latter is a union of set-generic
extensions of M .
Proof. If σ is a P-name, then there is α ∈ OrdM such that σ is already a Pα-name. Since πα+1
is dense, Gα+1 = π
′′
α+1G is Pα+1-generic. By property (5) of Definition 6.1, σ
G = σGα+1 ∈
M [Gα+1]. 
Lemma 6.3. Col(ω,Ord)M , Col∗(ω,Ord)
M and Col≥(ω,Ord)
M are approachable by projections.
Proof. Let P = Col(ω,Ord)M and let Pα = Col(ω, α). Furthermore, take πα+1 to be the map that,
for p ∈ Col(ω,Ord)M , replaces the value of p(n) by α whenever p(n) > α. Conditions (1), (2) and
(5) of Definition 6.1 are trivially satisfied. For (3) let p ∈ Col(ω,Ord)M and q ∈ Col(ω, α + 1)
such that q ≤Pα+1 πα+1(p). Then r = p ∪ {〈n, q(n)〉 | n ∈ dom(q) \ dom(p)} satisfies r ≤P p and
πα+1(r) ≤P q. For (4), consider p ∈ Col(ω, α) and q ∈ Col(ω,Ord)M such that πα+1(q) ≤P p.
Suppose n ∈ dom(p)∩dom(q). Since p ∈ Col(ω, α), p(n) < α and hence q(n) = πα+1(q)(n) = p(n).
Thus q ≤P p. The arguments for Col∗(ω,Ord)M and Col≥(ω,Ord)M are similar. 
Theorem 6.4. If P is approachable by projections, then the forcing relation for “v0 = v1” is
definable. Therefore, by Theorem 4.3, P satisfies the forcing theorem for every Ln-formula.
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Proof. Fix any ordinal α ∈M . We will show by induction on name rank that the forcing relation
for “v0 ⊆ v1”, restricted to names that only mention conditions in Pα, is definable. Then the
forcing relation for “v0 = v1” is definable by p P σ = τ if and only if p P σ ⊆ τ and p P τ ⊆ σ.
It will be easy to see that this is uniform in α, thus implying the desired statement.
For σ, τ ∈MPα and p ∈ P define p ∗P σ ⊆ τ if and only if
∀〈ρ, s〉 ∈ σ∀q ≤P p∃r ≤P q(r ≤P s→ ∃〈π, t〉 ∈ τ(r ≤P t ∧ r 
∗
P ρ = τ)).
Similiarly, let πα+1(p) 
∗,α+1
P σ ⊆ τ denote the same formula as above but where p is replaced by
πα+1(p), 
∗
P is replaced by 
∗,α+1
P and all quantifiers over P are restricted to Pα+1. Furthermore,
p ∗P σ = τ is an abbreviation for p 
∗
P σ ⊆ τ and p 
∗
P τ ⊆ σ and similarly for 
∗,α+1
P .
We will show by induction on the rank of Pα-names that
p ∗P σ ⊆ τ if and only if πα+1(p) 
∗,α+1
P σ ⊆ τ.(∗)
The right-hand side is clearly definable with parameter α, since Pα+1 is a set forcing. Moreover,
by the usual proof, p ∗P σ ⊆ τ if and only if p P σ ⊆ τ . This shows that assuming (∗), the
forcing relation for “v0 ⊆ v1” restricted to Pα-names is definable.
Assume first that p P σ ⊆ τ and let 〈ρ, s〉 ∈ σ and q¯ ≤Pα+1 πα+1(p). By (3) there is q ≤P p
such that πα+1(q) ≤P q¯. By assumption there is r ≤P q witnessing p ∗P σ ⊆ τ . Using (2),
πα+1(r) ≤P q¯. Now if r P s, then πα+1(r) P s by (4). Otherwise, assume that 〈π, t〉 ∈ τ
such that r ≤P t and r ∗P ρ = π. Again by (2) and (5) we have πα+1(r) ≤P t and inductively,
πα+1(r) 
∗,α+1
P ρ = π.
For the converse, suppose πα+1(p) 
∗,α+1
P σ ⊆ τ and let 〈ρ, s〉 ∈ σ. Let q ≤P p. By (2) we have
πα+1(q) ≤P πα+1(p) and thus there is r¯ ≤Pα+1 πα+1(q) witnessing πα+1(p) 
∗,α+1
P σ ⊆ τ . Using
(3), choose r ≤P q such that πα+1(r) ≤P r¯. Now if r¯⊥Pα+1s, then also r⊥Ps because if t ≤P r, s,
then πα+1(t) ≤P r¯, s by (2) and (5). So assume that r¯ and s are compatible and take u¯ ∈ Pα+1
such that u¯ ≤P r¯, s. Hence again using that πα+1(p) ∗P σ ⊆ τ there is v¯ ≤Pα+1 u¯ such that v¯ ≤P s
and there is 〈π, t〉 ∈ τ such that v¯ ≤P t and v¯ 
∗,α+1
P ρ = π. Now since v¯ ≤Pα+1 πα+1(q) there
exists v ≤P q such that πα+1(v) ≤P v¯, so πα+1(v) 
∗,α+1
P ρ = τ . Then by (4) we get that v ≤P s, t
and inductively, v ∗P ρ = τ . 
The following lemma shows that the converse does not hold in general.
Lemma 6.5. Suppose that M is a countable transitive model of ZFC. There is a tame notion of
class forcing which is not approachable by projections.
Proof. Let P be Jensen coding, as described in [BJW82]. Then P is a tame notion of forcing,
i.e. it preserves ZFC. Assume that M |= GCH (otherwise ensure this by previously forcing GCH).
Then the extension of M is M [G] = L[x] for some real x which is not contained in any set forcing
extension of M , so by Lemma 6.2, P cannot be approachable by projections. 
The next lemma shows that approachability by projections is essentially a weakening of being
an increasing union of set-sized complete subforcings.
Lemma 6.6. If P =
⋃
α∈OrdM Pα is an increasing union of set-sized complete subforcings (as
witnessed by a class in C), then there is a dense embedding i ∈ C, i : P → B from P into an
M -complete Boolean algebra B ∈ C which is approachable by projections. Moreover, P and B have
the same generic extensions, i.e. whenever G is B-generic over M, then M [G] =M [i−1[G]].
Proof. By passing to separative quotients, we can assume that every Pα is separative and anti-
symmetric. Since each Pα is a set forcing, it has a Boolean completion B(Pα) given by the set
of all regular open subsets of Pα and there is a dense embedding eα : Pα → B(Pα). By defining
suitable embeddings iαβ from B(Pα) into B(Pβ) and then forming the quotient of
⋃
α∈OrdM B(Pα)
modulo the equivalence relation b0 ∼ b1 iff b1 = iαβ(b0) if b0 ∈ B(Pα) and b1 ∈ B(Pβ) and
α < β or b0 = iαβ(b1) if b0 ∈ B(Pα) and b1 ∈ B(Pβ) and α ≥ β, we obtain a Boolean algebra
B =
⋃
α∈OrdM Bα, where every Bα = {[b] | b ∈ B(Pα)} is a complete subforcing of B. Note that
the equivalence classes are, in general, proper classes. We can avoid this problem by considering
[b] = {c ∈
⋃
α∈Ord
B(Pα) | b ∼ c ∧ ∃α ∈ Ord
M [c ∈ B(Pα) ∧ ¬∃β < α ∃d ∈ B(Pβ) (d ∼ b)]}.
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Define, for every α ∈ OrdM , the projection πα+1 by setting
πα+1([b]) = sup{[c] ∈ Bα+1 | [c] ≤ [b]}
for every [b] ∈ B. Straightforward calculations yield those projections to witness that B is ap-
proachable by projections. Moreover, i : P → B, i(p) = [eα(p)] for p ∈ Pα is a dense embedding.
By standard computations using that every Pα is a complete subforcing of P and that the analo-
gous property holds for Bα and B, it holds that for every B-generic filter G, M [G] =M [i−1[G]] as
desired. 
Lemma 6.7. There is a notion of class forcing which is an increasing union of set-sized complete
subforcings but not pretame.
Proof. By Lemma 2.2, the forcing notion Col≥(ω,Ord)
M is an increasing union of set-sized com-
plete subforcings, but it is not pretame since it adds a cofinal function from ω to the ordinals. 
If we combine Lemma 6.6 and Theorem 6.4 with the results from the previous section, we
obtain that every union of set-sized complete subforcings has a Boolean completion and satisfies
the forcing theorem for all Ln-formulae. As an application we obtain that any OrdM -length
iteration and product of set forcing notions in M satisfies the forcing theorem for Ln-formulae.
Note however that the fact that unions of set-sized complete subforcings satisfy the forcing theorem
for L∈-formulae has already been proven by Zarach in [Zar73].
7. Failures of the definability lemma
The main goal of this section is to show that for every countable transitive model M of ZF−,
the forcing relation of FM (as defined in Section 2) is not first-order definable over 〈M,Def(M)〉.
Furthermore, we will prove that for certain models M of ZFC its forcing relation is not M -
amenable. Whenever it is clear from context which model is referred to, we write F for FM .
Unless stated otherwise, M = 〈M, C〉 will denote an arbitrary countable transitive model of GB−.
Following [Dra74, Chapter 3.5], we let Fml ⊆ <ωω denote the set of all codes for L∈-formulae.
Since we work inside some model V of set theory and we use these codes inside countable transitive
models that are elements of V together with the corresponding formalized satisfaction relation, we
may assume that each element of Fml is the Go¨del number pϕq of an L∈-formula ϕ. For k ∈ ω, let
Fmlk denote the set of all Go¨del numbers for formulae with free variables among {v0, . . . , vk−1}.
For the sake of simplicity, we will assume that every L∈-formula ϕ is in the following normal form:
Whenever ∃vkψ is a subformula of ϕ, then the free variables of ψ are among {v0, . . . , vk}.
Definition 7.1. A relation T ⊆ Fml1 ×M is a first-order truth predicate for M if
〈pϕq, x〉 ∈ T ⇐⇒ 〈M,∈〉 |= ϕ(x)
holds for every pϕq ∈ Fml1 and every x ∈M .
Let G be an F-generic filter over M and let E and F be defined as in the proof of Lemma 2.6.
Then
T = {〈pϕq, x〉 ∈ Fml1 ×M | 〈ω,E〉 |= ϕ(F
−1(x))} ⊆M
is a first-order truth predicate forM and, by Tarski’s Undefinability Theorem, T cannot be defined
over M by a first-order formula. In the following, we will show that definability of the forcing
relation for F would lead to a first-order definition of T .
Notation. If ~x = x0, . . . , xk−1 is a sequence in M , we say that a sequence ~n = n0, . . . , nk−1 in ω is
appropriate for ~x, if for all i, j < k, xi = xj if and only if ni = nj . We inductively define p
~x
~n ∈ F
as follows, whenever ~n is a sequence of natural numbers which is appropriate for ~x.
(1) If k = 0, then p∅∅ = 1F.
(2) If ~n, nk is appropriate for ~x, xk, given p = p
~x
~n, let p
~x,xk
~n,nk
be the condition q ∈ F with domain
dq = dp ∪ {nk}, fq = fp ∪ {〈nk, xk〉} and
eq = ep ∪ {〈nk, ni〉 | i ∈ ~n ∧ xk ∈ xi} ∪ {〈ni, nk〉 | i ∈ ~n ∧ xi ∈ xk}.
Clearly, we obtain that whenever ~x extends ~y, ~n extends ~m and ~n is appropriate for ~x, then
p~x~n ≤F p
~y
~m. Furthermore, we define p
~x to be the condition p~x~n, where ~n is the lexicographically
smallest sequence which is appropriate for ~x.
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Before we proceed to prove that the definability lemma can fail for F, we need a translation
from L∈-formulae to Lω1,0(F,M)-formulae so that we can apply Theorem 5.5, where L

ω1,0(F,M)-
formulae are LOrd,0(F,M)-formulae in which all conjunctions and disjunctions are countable.
Notation. Inductively, we assign to every L∈-formula ϕ with free variables in {v0, . . . , vk−1} and
all sequences ~n = n0, . . . , nk−1 of natural numbers an Lω1,0(F,M)-formula ϕ
∗
~n as follows:
(vi = vj)
∗
~n = (nˇi = nˇj)
(vi ∈ vj)
∗
~n = (op(nˇi, nˇj) ∈ E˙)
(¬ϕ)∗~n = (¬ϕ
∗
~n)
(ϕ ∨ ψ)∗~n = (ϕ
∗
~n ∨ ψ
∗
~n)
(∃vkϕ)
∗
~n = (
∨
i∈ω
ϕ∗~n,i).
If ~n = 0, . . . , k− 1, then we simply write ϕ∗ for ϕ∗~n and if ~x is a sequence in M and ~n is such that
p~x = p~x~n, then we write ϕ
∗
~x for ϕ
∗
~n. In particular, if v0 is the only free variable of ϕ, then ϕ
∗
x is ϕ
∗.
The next lemma is the key ingredient to obtain a first-order truth predicate T for M. We will
use the translation of L∈-formulae to Lω1,0(F,M)-formulae to define truth by 〈M,∈〉 |= ϕ(x) if
and only if 〈ω,E〉 |= ϕ(n), where n = F (x), if and only if px F ϕ∗x.
Lemma 7.2. For every L∈-formula ϕ with free variables among {v0, . . . , vk−1} and for all ~x =
x0, . . . , xk−1 ∈M , the following conditions hold:
(1) M |= ϕ(~x) if and only if p~x MF ϕ
∗
~x.
(2) M |= ¬ϕ(~x) if and only if p~x MF ¬ϕ
∗
~x.
Proof. First, we verify that for every formula ϕ with free variables among {v0, . . . , vk−1}, and for
all ~n ∈ ωk appropriate for ~x,
p~x F ϕ
∗
~x ⇐⇒ p
~x
~n F ϕ
∗
~n.(∗)
Let p~x F ϕ
∗
~x and let ~m be such that p
~x = p~x~m. Consider the automorphism π on F that for
every condition p = 〈dp, ep, fp〉 replaces every mi appearing in dp, ep and dom(fp) by ni. Clearly,
π(p~x) = p~x~n and so p
~x
~n F ϕ
∗
~n. The converse follows in the same way.
Working in V, we now verify (1) and (2) by induction on the complexity of formulae. Observe
that it suffices to check only that M |= ϕ(~x) implies p~x F ϕ∗~x and that M |= ¬ϕ(~x) implies
p~x F ¬ϕ∗~x, since the backwards directions of (1) and (2) immediately follow from the forward
directions of (2) and (1) respectively.
For equations this is obvious. Suppose now that M |= x ∈ y. Let G be generic over M with
px,y ∈ G. Then by definition of px,y, 〈0, 1〉 ∈ E implying thatM[G] |= ((v0 ∈ v1)∗)G. The converse
is similar.
For negations, both (1) and (2) follow directly from the induction hypothesis.
We turn to disjunctions. Assume that M |= (ϕ∨ψ)(~x). Without loss of generality, assume that
M |= ϕ(~x). Then inductively, we get that p~x F ϕ∗~x. But then clearly p
~x F (ϕ∨ψ)∗~x. Conversely,
assume that M |= ¬(ϕ ∨ ψ)(~x). This means that M |= ¬ϕ(~x) and M |= ¬ψ(~x). By assumption,
this means that p~x F ¬ϕ∗~x ∧ ¬ψ
∗
~x, hence p
~x F ¬(ϕ ∨ ψ)∗~x.
Suppose now that M |= ∃vkϕ(~x, vk). Then there is y ∈M such that M |= ϕ(~x, y). This means
that p~x,y F ϕ
∗
~x,y. Let ~n be the sequence such that p
~x = p~x~n. Now observe that by (∗), we have for
every i ∈ ω such that ~n, i is appropriate for ~x, y that p~x,y~n,i F ϕ
∗
~n,i. Take an F-generic filter G over
M with p~x = px~n ∈ G. By a density argument, there is i ∈ ω such that ~n, i is appropriate for ~x, y
and p~x,y~n,i ∈ G. By assumption, this implies that M[G] |= (ϕ
∗
~n,i)
G, hence also M[G] |= ((∃vkϕ)∗~x)
G.
Assume now that M |= ¬∃vkϕ(~x, vk). Then for every y ∈ M , M |= ¬ϕ(~x, y). Let ~n be the
sequence in ωk with p~x = p~x~n. We have to show that p
~x  ¬
∨
i∈ω ϕ
∗
~n,i. Let G be F-generic over M
with p~x ∈ G and suppose for a contradiction that M[G] |= (
∨
i∈ω ϕ
∗
~n,i)
G. Then there is i ∈ ω such
that M[G] |= (ϕ∗~n,i)
G. Furthermore, there must be some y ∈ M such that p~x,y~n,i ∈ G. However,
since M |= ¬ϕ(~x, y), p~x,y F ¬ϕ∗~x,y and therefore by (∗), p
~x,y
~n,i F ¬ϕ
∗
~n,i which is absurd. 
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For the rest of this section, we will assume, without loss of generality, that whenever ϕ has
exactly one free variable vi, then i = 0.
Theorem 7.3. If F satisfies the definability lemma for “v0 ∈ v1” or for “v0 = v1” over M, then
C contains a first-order truth predicate for M .
Proof. If the definability lemma holds either for “v0 ∈ v1” or for “v0 = v1”, then F satisfies the
uniform forcing theorem for LOrd,0(F,M)-formulae as a consequence of Theorem 5.5. But then
by Lemma 7.2,
T = {〈pϕq, x〉 | pϕq ∈ Fml1, x ∈M,p
x MF ϕ
∗} ∈ C
is a first-order truth predicate for M . 
Proof of Theorem 1.3. Let M be a countable transitive model of ZF−. Assume, towards a contra-
diction, that the set {〈p, σ, τ〉 | p MF “σ = τ”} is definable over M . Then M = 〈M,Def(M)〉 is a
model of GB− and F satisfies the definability lemma for atomic formulae overM. By Theorem 7.3,
there is a first-order truth predicate for M that is first-order definable over M . This contradicts
Tarski’s theorem on the undefinability of truth. 
Theorem 7.3 can also be used to provide an alternative proof of the following well-known fact.
Corollary 7.4. If M is a model of KM, then C contains a first-order truth predicate for M .
Proof. By Theorem 5.8, F satisfies the definability lemma for all Ln-formulae over M, so by
Theorem 7.3, C contains a first-order truth predicate for M . 
We can even do better and find fixed names ν and µ ∈ MF such that the forcing theorem for
ν = µ implies the existence of a first-order truth predicate.
Lemma 7.5. There exist µ, ν ∈MF and {〈pϕq, qpϕq〉 | pϕq ∈ Fml1} ∈M such that
(1) If ϕ has one free variable and x ∈M , then M |= ϕ(x) iff for all r ≤F px, qpϕq, r F µ = ν.
(2) If ϕ is a sentence, then M |= ϕ iff qpϕq F µ = ν.
Proof. Since the proof of (2) is a simplified version of the proof of (1), we only verify (1). Choose
an antichain {qn | n ∈ ω} ⊆ F such that for every n ∈ ω, 0 /∈ dom(qn), e.g. take
qn = 〈{1, . . . , n+ 1}, {〈1, n+ 1〉}, ∅〉.
Consider the names νpϕ∗q, µpϕ∗q as defined in Lemma 5.2. We will only consider non-atomic
formulae, since all atomic formulae with at most one free variable are either tautologically true
or false. The proof of Lemma 5.2 shows that for pϕq ∈ Fml1 with ϕ non-atomic, all elements of
νpϕ∗q, µpϕ∗q are of the form 〈τ,1F〉 for some τ ∈ MF. Let k : ω → Fml1 be a bijection and let
j : ω → Fmlω1,0(F,M) be given by j(n) = pϕ
∗q, where k(n) = pϕq. Now set
ν = {〈τ, qn〉 | 〈τ,1F〉 ∈ νj(n)}
µ = {〈τ, qn〉 | 〈τ,1F〉 ∈ µj(n)}.
This yields that qn F ν = νj(n) and q
n F µ = µj(n) for each n ∈ ω. Moreover, since 0 /∈ dom(q
n),
px0 and q
n are compatible for every x ∈M and n ∈ ω. For pϕq ∈ Fml1, we put
qpϕq = q
k−1(pϕq).
To check (1), suppose first that M |= ϕ(x) for some L∈-formula ϕ and x ∈ M . Let r ∈ F be
such that r ≤F px, qpϕq. Since r ≤F qpϕq, r F ν = νpϕ∗q ∧ µ = µpϕ∗q. On the other hand, since
r ≤F p
x, Lemma 7.2 implies that r F ϕ
∗, i.e. by Lemma 5.2, r F ν = µ. Conversely, assume that
M |= ¬ϕ(x). By (1) applied to the negation of ϕ, we have that for all r ≤F px, qp¬ϕq, r F µ = ν.
Since px and qp¬ϕq are compatible, such r exists. Now let π be the automorphism on F which for
p = 〈dp, ep, fp〉 swaps all occurrences of k−1(p¬ϕq) and k−1(pϕq) in dp, ep and dom(fp). Then
π(qp¬ϕq) ≤F qpϕq and π(px) = px. In particular, π(r) ≤F px, qpϕq and so π(r) F ν = νpϕ∗q ∧ µ =
µpϕ∗q. Moreover, since π(r) ≤F px, by Lemma 7.2 we obtain π(r) F ¬ϕ∗. Finally, by Lemma
5.2, this proves that π(r) F µpϕ∗q 6= νpϕ∗q and so π(r) F µ 6= ν. 
Corollary 7.6. There exist ν, µ ∈ MF such that if {p ∈ F | p F µ = ν} ∈ C, then C contains a
first-order truth predicate for M . In particular, {p ∈ F | p F µ = ν} is not definable over M . 
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In the remainder of this section, we show that amenability of the forcing relation for the forcing
F can consistently fail. We will work with a countable, transitive Paris model M |= ZF− (see
Section 1). Note that the least α such that Lα |= ZF
− is such a model.
Lemma 7.7. Let M be a countable transitive Paris model with M |= ZF−. Then
X = {qpϕq | pϕq ∈ Fml0, qpϕq F µ = ν}
is not an element of M , where qpϕq, µ, ν are as in Lemma 7.5.
Proof. Suppose for a contradiction that X ∈M . Observe that for every L∈-sentence,
(5) M |= ϕ ⇐⇒ qpϕq ∈ X.
Consider C = {pϕq | qp∃!x∈Ordϕ(x)q ∈ X}. Since X ∈ M , so is C. Observe that we can order the
elements of C by
pϕq < pψq ⇐⇒ qp∃x,y∈Ord[x<y∧ϕ(x)∧ψ(y)]q ∈ X.
As a consequence of (5), we know that 〈C,<〉 has order type OrdM , a contradiction. 
In particular, this shows Theorem 1.4.
8. A failure of the truth lemma
In this section, we show that the truth lemma can consistently fail for class forcing. Note that
by Lemma 5.2, if we find a notion of class forcing and an infinitary formula for which the truth
lemma fails, then we automatically obtain that it fails for “v0 = v1”.
We need the following basic result about two-step iterations of class forcing.
Lemma 8.1 ([Fri00], Lemma 2.30 (a)). Let M = 〈M, C〉 be a countable transitive model of GB−,
let P be a tame notion of class forcing and let Q˙ ∈ CP be a class name for a preorder. Then we
define the two-step iteration of P and Q˙ by
P ∗ Q˙ = {〈p, q˙〉 | p ∈ P ∧ p P q˙ ∈ Q˙}
equipped with the ordering given by 〈p0, q˙0〉 ≤P∗Q˙ 〈p1, q˙1〉 iff p0 ≤P p1 and p0 P q˙0 ≤Q˙ q˙1. If G is
P-generic and H is Q˙G-generic over M [G], then G∗H = {〈p, q˙〉 | p ∈ G∧ q˙G ∈ H} is P∗Q˙-generic
over M .
If P is any notion of class forcing that satisfies the forcing theorem, we denote by F˙ the canonical
class P-name for FM [G] in a P-generic extension M [G]. As an example of the failure of the truth
lemma, we will consider two-step iterations where the second iterand will be of the form FM [G],
where G is generic for the first iterand.
Theorem 8.2. Let M = 〈M, C〉 be a countable transitive model of GB. Let P be a notion of class
forcing which is definable over M and has the following properties:
(a) P is tame.
(b) There is a P-generic filter G such that M [G] is a Paris model.
(c) For every p ∈ G there is a P-generic filter G¯ such that M [G¯] is not a Paris model.
Then the truth lemma fails for P ∗ F˙.
Proof. We will find an infinitary formula Φ in LOrd,0(P ∗ F˙,M) such that if G ∗H is P ∗ F˙-generic
over M, then ΦG∗H expresses that M [G] is a Paris model. Using this, we choose G as in (b).
Then ΦG∗H holds, while by (c), there cannot be a condition in G ∗H forcing this, implying that
the truth lemma fails for P ∗ F˙.
Given a formula ϕ with exactly one free variable, let Ψpϕq denote the formula
ϕ(v0) ∧ ∀v1 [ϕ(v1) → v1 = v0] ,
i.e. Ψpϕq(x) states that “x is unique such that ϕ(x) holds”. Similarly, let Ω(x) be the formula
expressing that x is an ordinal. If G is P-generic over M , then M [G] is a Paris model if and only
if for all ordinals α ∈ M [G] there is ϕ such that M [G] |= Ψpϕq(α). Now recall that as described
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in Section 7, for each ϕ we can assign to Ψpϕq, Ω and n ∈ ω infinitary formulae (Ψpϕq)∗n and Ω
∗
n
in the forcing language of FM [G] with the properties (as in Lemma 7.2)
M [G] |= Ψpϕq(x) ⇐⇒ p
x
n 
M[G]
FM[G]
(Ψpϕq)
∗
n
M [G] |= Ω(x) ⇐⇒ pxn 
M[G]
FM[G]
Ω∗n.
However, since we will need infinitary formulae in the forcing language of P∗ F˙, we have to modify
this approach slightly. For a formula ψ and n ∈ ω, we define ψ∗∗n in the same way we defined ψ
∗
n,
but we replace every occurence of some condition p ∈ FM [G] by 〈1P, pˇ〉 ∈ P ∗ F˙. Note that this is
possible, since for every condition p which appears in ψ∗n, the function fp is empty, and so p ∈M .
Let
Φ =
∧
n∈ω
∨
pϕq∈Fml1
[Ω∗∗n −→ (Ψpϕq)
∗∗
n ] .
We claim that M [G] is a Paris model if and only if M [G][H ] |= ΦG∗H holds for every (or,
equivalently, for some) filter H which is FM [G]-generic over M [G]. Suppose first that M [G] is a
Paris model. Let H be FM [G]-generic over M [G] and n ∈ ω. By a density argument, there is
x ∈M [G] such that pxn (as defined in M [G]) is in H . Since M [G] is a Paris model, either M [G] |=
¬Ω(x) or there is some formula ϕ such that M [G] |= Ψpϕq(x). Let x˙ ∈MP be a name for x. Since
P is tame, it satisfies the truth lemma and hence there is q ∈ P with q MP [Ω(x˙)→ Ψpϕq(x˙)]. Let
p˙xn be a P-name for p
x
n ∈ F
M [G]. Then 〈q, p˙xn〉 
M
P∗F˙
[Ω∗∗n → (Ψpϕq)
∗∗
n ].
Conversely, suppose that M [G][H ] |= ΦG∗H . Let α ∈M [G] be an ordinal. Let n ∈ ω such that
pαn ∈ H . By assumption, there is pϕq ∈ Fml1 such that M [G][H ] |= ((Ψpϕq)
∗∗
n )
G∗H . We want
to verify that M [G] |= Ψpϕq(α). If not, we can proceed as before and obtain q ∈ G such that
〈q, p˙αn〉 
M
P∗F˙
(¬Ψpϕq)∗∗n , which is contradictory. 
Remark 8.3. By a special case of more general results in [Ena05] and [HLR13] there is a tame
notion of class forcing P∗ such that for every countable transitive GB−-model of the form M =
〈M,Def(M)〉, there is a P∗-generic filter G over M such that M [G] is pointwise definable. For the
benefit of the reader, we will describe a very simple tame notion of class forcing P and indicate
a proof that there is a P-generic extension which is a Paris model over any countable transitive
GB−-model M = 〈M,Def(M)〉 such that 〈M,∈〉 |= V = L. The outline of the argument follows
the proof of [Ena05, Theorem 2.8].
P is a two-step iteration, where the first step is to force with Q = 〈2<Ord,⊇〉 (note that this
forcing notion does not add new sets) and construct a Q-generic filter U such that all ordinals of
M are first-order definable over 〈M,∈, U〉 without parameters (this construction of U is done as in
[HLR13]). The second step is to code the generic U into the continuum function, using a reverse
Easton iteration. Since the ground model L is definable in the extension and every element of L
is definable in L from an ordinal, it follows that M [G] is pointwise definable.
The forcing notion P described in Remark 8.3 satisfies (a) and (b) over any countable transitive
model of GB− of the form 〈M,Def(M)〉. We will now give two consistent examples of such models
over which P also satisfies Condition (c) in the statement of Theorem 8.2.
Example 8.4. (1) The simplest possibility is to start with a model M = 〈M, C〉 of KM. By
forcing over the first-order part 〈M,Def(M)〉 of M, we may obtain a P-generic filter G such
that M [G] is a Paris model. On the other hand, we can force over the KM-model M and
choose a filter G¯ which is P-generic over M. Since P is tame, by [Ant15, Theorem 23]
M[G¯] |= KM. But this is a contradiction, since no model of KM is a Paris model:
Suppose for a contradiction that N = 〈N,D〉 is a model of KM which is a Paris model.
Using that D contains a first-order truth predicate for formulae with one free variable, it
follows that D contains a surjection from ω to OrdN , contradicting Replacement.
(2) If we want to avoid KM, we can instead start with a countable transitive model 〈M,∈〉 of
ZFC which has cardinality ℵ1 in L[M ] and which is closed under countable sequences in L[M ].
Now since the forcing P is σ-closed in M , for every p ∈ PM there is a PM -generic filter Gp
over M in L[M ] containing p. Since M is uncountable in L[M ], no generic extension of the
form M [Gp] is a Paris model. Note that it is easy to obtain such a model M starting in a
model of V = L with an inaccessible cardinal and then forcing with Col(ω, ω1).
CLASS FORCING, THE FORCING THEOREM AND BOOLEAN COMPLETIONS 21
In particular, this proves Theorem 1.5.
9. Non-isomorphic Boolean completions
Any separative set-sized partial order P has a Boolean completion that is provided by the regular
open subsets of P, and this completion is unique: if B0 and B1 are both Boolean completions of
P and e0 : P → B0 and e1 : P → B1 are dense embeddings, then one can define an isomorphism
by f(b) = sup{e1(p) | p ∈ P ∧ e0(p) ≤ b} for b ∈ B0. Moreover, f fixes P in the sense that
f(e0(p)) = e1(p) for every condition p ∈ P. This proof however does not work for class forcing
since in general, we can only form set-sized suprema within M-complete Boolean algebras. In the
remainder of this section, we will show that the result actually fails for class forcing.
Definition 9.1. We say that a notion of class forcing P has a unique Boolean completion in M, if
P has a Boolean completion B0 in M and for every other Boolean completion B1 of P in M there
is an isomorphism in V between B0 and B1 which fixes P.
Definition 9.2. We say that a notion of class forcing P satisfies the Ord-chain condition (or
simply Ord-cc) over M, if every antichain of P which is in C is already in M .
Lemma 9.3. Let P be a notion of class forcing for M which satisfies the forcing theorem and let
A ⊆ P be a class in C such that A does not have a supremum in P. Let Q = P ∪ {supA}, where
supA ∈M is a new element which is not in P and let ≤Q be such that
≤Q ↾ (P× P) =≤P,
supA ≤Q p⇐⇒ ∀a ∈ A(a ≤Q p) and
p ≤Q supA⇐⇒ A is predense below p.
Then Q satisfies the forcing theorem.
Proof. For σ ∈ MQ, let σ+ denote the P-name obtained from σ by replacing every occurrence
of supA in tc(σ) by 1P, and let σ
− ∈ MP be the name obtained from σ by removing every
pair of the form 〈µ, supA〉 from tc(σ). To be precise about the latter, we inductively define
σ− = {〈τ−, p〉 ∈ σ | p 6= supA}. One easily checks that for all p ∈ Q and all Q-names σ and τ ,
p Q σ ∈ τ ⇐⇒ ∀q ∈ P
[
q ≤Q p→ [(q⊥PA→ q P σ
− ∈ τ−) ∧ (q ≤P A→ q P σ
+ ∈ τ+)]
]
,
where q ≤P A abbreviates ∃a ∈ A (q ≤P a) and q⊥PA abbreviates ∀a ∈ A (q⊥Pa). 
Under below assumptions on M, the authors originally showed that there is a particular class
forcing for M which has a non-unique Boolean completion. The following more general result was
then observed and pointed out to the authors by Joel David Hamkins.
Theorem 9.4. Let M = 〈M, C〉 be a model of GB− such that C contains a well-order of M of
order type OrdM . Then a separative antisymmetric notion of class forcing P for M has a unique
Boolean completion in M if and only if it satisfies the Ord-cc over M.
Proof. Suppose first that P satisfies the Ord-cc over M. As can easily be observed from the
combinatorial characterization of pretameness in [Fri00, Chapter 2.2], since C contains a global
well-order of M , P is pretame and therefore it has a Boolean completion B(P) ∈ C by Corollary
5.6. Let B be another Boolean completion of P. Without loss of generality, we can assume that P
is a subset of B. Then every element b ∈ B satisfies b = supBDb, where Db = {p ∈ P | p ≤B b} ∈ C.
But using the global well-order ofM we obtain that Db contains an antichain which is maximal in
Db. Moreover, since P satisfies the Ord-cc, every such antichain lies in M . Furthermore, observe
that if A and A′ are two antichains which are maximal in Db, then supBA = supBA
′ = b and
supB(P)A = supB(P)A
′. But this gives a canonical embedding of B into B(P) which fixes P. It is
clearly surjective, since the same argument as above can be done within B(P). This shows that P
has a unique Boolean completion in the sense of Definition 9.1.
Conversely, assume that C contains an antichain A of P which is not in M . Moreover, suppose
that P satisfies the forcing theorem and therefore it has a Boolean completion B(P) as provided
by Theorem 5.5 (otherwise P has no Boolean completion and in particular no unique Boolean
completion). We may assume that P ⊆ B(P). Note that A remains a class-sized antichain in B(P).
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We may assume, by replacing A with some subclass of A if necessary, that A has order type OrdM
with respect to the given wellorder of M .
We claim that A contains a subclass in C which does not have a supremum in B(P). Assume,
towards a contradiction, that every subclass of A which is in C has a supremum in B(P). Then
since A is an antichain, the mapping i : P(A) ∩ C → B(P) given by i(X) = supB(P)X is injective.
By assumption, there is a surjection OrdM →M . But by the above, this yields a surjection from
OrdM onto P(A)∩ C and hence there is a surjection s : OrdM → P(OrdM )∩ C, since A has order
type OrdM . Consider now C = {α ∈ OrdM | α /∈ s(α)} and let α ∈ OrdM such that C = s(α).
But this leads to Russell’s paradox, since α ∈ s(α) = C if and only if α /∈ s(α).
We may therefore, without loss of generality, assume that A does not have a supremum in
B(P). Using Lemma 9.3, we can enlarge B(P) to a notion of forcing Q which satisfies the forcing
theorem, such that A has a supremum in Q. Moreover, it is straightforward to check that this
notion of forcing Q provided by Lemma 9.3 is antisymmetric and separative, so we can find a
Boolean completion B(Q) of Q as provided by Theorem 5.5. We may assume that Q ⊆ B(Q).
Since P is dense in Q, B(Q) is also a Boolean completion of P.
It is now straightforward to check that any isomorphism between B(P) and B(Q) which fixes P
will also fix B(P). Since B(P) ( Q ⊆ B(Q), such an isomorphism cannot exist. 
Example 9.5. There are many examples of notions of forcing P over a model M of GB− with a
global well-order of order type OrdM which have a Boolean completion which is not unique up
to isomorphisms preserving P. The simplest examples are the collapse forcings Col(ω,Ord)M and
Col∗(ω,Ord)
M which both have a Boolean completion by Lemma 6.3 and Theorem 5.5. However,
they clearly have class-sized antichains such as {〈0, α〉 | α ∈ OrdM} and therefore do not have a
unique Boolean completion by the characterization above.
10. Open Questions
A topic which has not yet been discussed systematically is the preservation of the axioms of ZFC
in class forcing extensions with the generic filter and the ground model as predicates. Preservation
of Replacement and Power Set have been characterized by Sy Friedman in [Fri00]. However, as
one can easily observe, all collapse forcings which we have mentioned in this paper do not only
destroy Replacement but also Separation. It is therefore natural to ask the following question,
which shall be discussed in [HKSb].
Question 10.1. Is there a notion of class forcing which preserves Separation, but not Replace-
ment? If so, does preservation of Separation already imply the forcing theorem?
Since the notions of forcing used in the above counterexamples destroy many axioms of ZFC
even without the generic filter and the ground model as predicates, the following question arises.
Question 10.2. Suppose that P is a class forcing over a countable transitive model M of ZFC
such that (M [G],∈) (without the generic filter and the ground model as predicates) satisfies ZFC
for every P-generic filter G over M . Does P satisfy the forcing theorem?
The reason why the forcing FM , as introduced in Section 2, does not satisfy the forcing theorem,
is essentially because it adds a specific subset E of ω. It would be interesting to know how closely
connected failures of the forcing theorem are to such witnessing sets :
Question 10.3. Let M be a countable transitive model of ZFC. Assume P and Q are both notions
of class forcing for M , which have the same generic extensions without predicates, i.e. for which
{M [G] | G is generic for P over M} = {M [H ] | H is generic for Q over M}. Assume further that
P satisfies the forcing theorem. Does it follow that Q satisfies the forcing theorem?
A further question is concerned with the amenability of the forcing relation. In Section 7, we
have shown that for countable transitive Paris models M |= ZF−, the forcing relation for FM is
not amenable. The following questions remain open.
Question 10.4. (1) Is there a notion of class forcing P such that for every model M of ZFC,
the forcing relation for P is not amenable for M?
(2) Are there any provable implications between the amenability of the forcing relation and the
truth lemma?
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We have shown that in certain models, there is a tame notion of class forcing P such that P ∗ F˙
does not satisfy the truth lemma. However the following question is still open.
Question 10.5. Is there a notion of class forcing P such that for every model of ZFC, the truth
lemma for P fails?
Furthermore, we do not know whether the two-step iteration of notions of class forcing satisfying
the truth lemma, with the first forcing in fact being tame, again satisfies the truth lemma, thus
also the following question is open.
Question 10.6. Does the forcing F, as introduced in Section 2, provably satisfy the Truth Lemma?
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